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We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining in which policy making proceeds
until the proposer has no more incentive to make a new proposal to replace the
previously approved policy. We characterize stationary Markov perfect equilibria for
the game and show that in all pure-strategy equilibria, a majority of voters without
proposal power have an incentive to protect each others￿bene￿ts to secure their own
long-term bargaining positions in the legislature. As a consequence, the value of
proposal power is constrained.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: C72, D72, D78.
Keywords: Legislative bargaining, proposal power, reconsideration, evolving de-
fault, distributive politics.1 Introduction
Legislative decision-making is one of the most fundamental political institutions. In
recent years it has been commonly modeled as a multilateral bargaining process with
some majoritarian voting rule as the decision rule. The basic idea, developed by
Baron and Ferejohn (1989a), is that a policy is made upon in a sequence of proposal
making and voting stages by members of a legislature until a proposal is accepted
by any decisive coalition. Perhaps one most fundamental insight of this literature is
the importance of the "power to propose" (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; Baron and
Ferejohn, 1989a,b), that is, the ability of a designated proposer to take considerably
more of the bene￿ts than any other legislator. For example, in the baseline model
of Baron and Ferejohn (1989a) with a closed amendment rule, any proposer makes
a policy proposal to satisfy a bare majority of the "cheapest" voters necessary to
ensure acceptance, fully expropriating the voters excluded from this minimal winning
coalition. As a consequence, the distribution of bene￿ts in equilibrium is highly
unequal, with the proposer taking a disproportionally large share.
A key assumption of the Baron-Ferejohn model is that decision-making on a given
issue e⁄ectively ends when a majority approves a proposal. However, in real-life
politics legislators may be able to ask to reconsider a passed bill. In particular, the
passage of a bill does not prevent the legislature from coming back to the same policy
issue at a later date. Rather, it changes the default for subsequent policy making.
This feature of sequential bargaining was recently pointed out by Bernheim,
Rangel and Rayo (2006), who proposed a distributive model of legislative bargain-
ing with the possibility of reconsideration. They assume ￿xed and ￿nite rounds of
proposal making and common knowledge of the sequence of proposers before any leg-
islative action begins. Given that su¢ ciently many legislators have a chance to make
1a policy proposal, in the unique equilibrium the last proposer is able to implement
his ideal policy. The model of Bernheim et al. thus yields an extreme form of pro-
posal power, generated by the privileged position of the last proposer. This suggests
that reconsideration would only strengthen proposal power and lead to fully unequal
allocation of public resources.
In this paper, we modify a critical element of Bernheim et al. (2006). Speci￿-
cally, in our analytical framework the last proposal round is endogenously determined
rather than exogenously given. In other words, policy making is ￿nalized only after
the legislator with proposal power has no more incentive to replace the previously
approved policy. This apparently minor modi￿cation nevertheless leads to radically
di⁄erent implications, as there arise incentives among the non-proposing legislators,
or voters, to limit the ability of the proposer to expropriate others. To make this
point as clear as possible, we model the pure case where only one legislator is per-
sistently conferred the power to make policy proposals and all other legislators have
no proposal power at all. The assumption of a single persistent proposer serves the
theoretical purpose to isolate endogenous constraints on proposal power.1
As we show, the possibility of reconsideration induces a group of voters to "de-
fend" the bene￿ts for one another and implicitly coordinate their behavior against
the sole powerful proposer. In particular, self-interested voters may decline any pol-
icy proposal when some other voters are substantially expropriated. In equilibrium,
voters protect others as a means to prevent the proposer from playing o⁄ the voters
against each other in the future. Intuitively, voter A protects voter B so that proposer
C cannot use the low reservation value of B to exploit A. The voters￿incentive to
1Some legislative systems, however, come quite close to this idealized case. For example, compar-
ative scholars have long observed that the constitutional features of parliamentary systems lead to
high levels of agenda control by the executive, i.e. the cabinet (D￿ring, 1995). In the U.S. Congress,
the proposal power over some policy issues is e⁄ectively held by members of the associated House
Committees (Knight, 2005).
2protect counterbalances the proposer￿ s ability to exploit, which leads to a more equal
allocation of bene￿ts. The ex post value of proposal power is therefore substantially
limited. Our theory applies to risk-neutral, purely self-interested agents. It does not
depend on risk-aversion or any form of fairness concerns. The underlying mechanism
can be illustrated by two examples below.
Example 1 Consider a legislature with three players. The ￿rst player is assumed to
be the proposer. The legislature must divide 6 dollars, where each dollar is indivisible.
Suppose the initial default is x0 = (1;2;3); where the i-th element of x0 refers to the
amount that goes to the i-th player. A default is the policy that will be implemented
at the end of the legislative session if no new policy is made in the rest of the session.
The proposer has sole power to make proposals and initiate reconsiderations. A
proposal, once made, is immediately voted in the legislature by majority rule against
the default. A policy proposal, once approved in the legislature, serves as the new
default and may be subject to reconsideration if the proposer chooses to make a new
proposal to replace it. The policy that (as default) survives until the end of the
legislative session is the ￿nal policy outcome.
It is easy to see that in a one-round closed-rule legislative bargaining game, the
proposer would propose y = (4;2;0): This policy would be approved by the players
who receive positive bene￿ts and rejected by the player who receives nothing. Notice
that the last player is fully expropriated since his vote is not necessary for the approval
of the proposal. Now consider the case where the proposer is likely to have a chance to
reconsider the policy issue and make another proposal. Then the second player would
not accept policy y in equilibrium, even though y yields her exactly the same amount
of bene￿ts as the default. To see why, consider counterfactually what would happen
if this player accepted y. In this situation, the proposer would have an incentive to
3reconsider the policy issue and propose (6;0;0); which would not be vetoed by the
last player, who is indi⁄erent. This implies that the second player would be eventually
fully expropriated if she voted for y in the ￿rst place.
By the same logic, the proposer is not able to pass any policy that gives the last
player, whose vote is not needed, any amount less than 2 dollars. The equilibrium
policy outcome is thus (2;2;2); an egalitarian division of the 6 dollars. In this equi-
librium, the second player wants to protect the bene￿ts for the last player, since by
doing so the second player secures her long-term bargaining position in the legisla-
ture. Note that the value of proposal power is substantially reduced compared to a
case without reconsideration.
Example 2 Consider a legislature with ￿ve players. Again, the ￿rst player is as-
sumed to be the sole proposer. The legislature must divide 10 dollars, where each
dollar is indivisible. Suppose the initial default is (0;1;2;3;4): Assume the political
process is as given in the previous example. As before, in one-round closed-rule leg-
islative bargaining, the proposer would propose z = (7;1;2;0;0): The last two players
are fully expropriated since their votes are not necessary for the approval of the pro-
posal. However, if under some institution the proposer is likely to have a chance to
reconsider the policy issue and make another proposal, players 2 and 3 would not
accept policy z in equilibrium. With z as the new default policy, they would be fully
expropriated and eventually given nothing.
One possible policy proposal players 2 and 3 would accept in an equilibrium is
x￿ = (4;2;2;2;0): With x￿ as the new default, the proposer would not be able to pass
any new policy that gives himself more than 4 dollars. This is because players 2; 3 and
4 all have incentives to protect the bene￿ts for one another. If any player i 2 f2;3;4g
was expropriated and given less than 2 dollars, the proposer would have an incentive
4to reconsider the policy and ally with both the last player and the expropriated one
to increase his own bene￿t entitlement.
In this equilibrium, some voter, player 4 in the example, is not fully expropriated
even if his vote is not needed. Players 2 and 3 vote for x￿ against the default, and
player 2 is even given more than what he would receive from the default. The value
of proposal power is substantially reduced. Out of fear that the proposer may use his
proposal power to exploit those players with lower reservation values in the future, a
group of players take care of one another even if they are self-interested.
The purpose of this paper is primarily theoretical. We develop a general distrib-
utive model that identi￿es clearly the e⁄ects illustrated in the above examples, and
show that the endogenous limits to proposal power, imposed by the voters, are ro-
bust in all pure-strategy stationary equilibria if the probability for reconsideration is
su¢ ciently high.
We also identify a second class of stationary equilibria characterized by mixed pro-
posal strategies. In those equilibria, the proposer randomizes among possible winning
coalitions and strategically designs a series of policy proposals so that he eventually
captures almost all of the bene￿ts. The pattern of these equilibria is similar to that
of Kalandrakis (2004, 2007), who constructs a mixed-strategy stationary equilibrium
for legislative bargaining in a dynamic environment where after periods of transi-
tion every proposer takes all the bene￿ts. However, we argue that if the legislature
needs to make a collective decision on whether to discuss a policy, i.e. to put it
on the agenda, these mixed-strategy equilibria disappear and only the pure-strategy
equilibria survive.
It is important to distinguish our theory from one that is based on weaker forms of
proposal protocols in legislative bargaining. Baron and Ferejohn (1989a) argue that
5agendas that allow for (possibly nested) amendments, the so-called "open amend-
ment rules," may e⁄ectively lead to weaker proposer premiums and more egalitarian
allocation of the bene￿ts. As a proposer gives away more bene￿ts to more voters
in the legislature, he could reduce the probability that some other legislator submits
an amendment and therefore his proposal is more likely to be approved. A limited
proposal power in this case thus results from voluntary choices by the proposer due
to a trade-o⁄ between the approval probability and the extent of exploitation.
The endogenous constraints on proposal power in our theory, on the other hand,
does not rely on a more dispersed allocation of proposal power. Instead, it arises from
equilibrium behavior of the non-proposers even in the closed-rule case. Our analytical
framework thus o⁄ers a novel yet complementary mechanism of sequential majoritar-
ian bargaining that, while potentially of equal importance, has been overlooked. With
the possibility of reconsideration, the voters are induced to take care of some of the
others, so that the proposer is limited to make a policy proposal from a smaller set of
policies that allocate the bene￿ts more equally. Counterintuitively, this e⁄ect is espe-
cially strong when there is only one single legislator that persistently holds proposal
power. Importantly, a concentration of proposal power through procedure does not
necessarily lead to valuable proposal power in outcomes.
Motivated by recent empirical literature that questions the extent of proposal
power implied by the model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989a, 1989b), various other
explanations for the limits of proposal power have been proposed, ranging from dif-
ferent proposal protocols (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989a; Morelli, 1999), risk aversion
(Battaglini and Palfrey, 2007; Bowen and Zahran, 2007), to dynamic risk-sharing
(Dixit, Grossman and Gul, 2000), and even fairness and entitlement concerns (Dier-
meier and Gailmard, 2006).2 Of course, we provide an alternative account for some
2As various distributive models of legislative bargaining have been tested in laboratory exper-
6stylized facts, e.g. why a proposer may allocate positive bene￿ts to more than a
minimum winning coalition of legislators. More importantly, our theory leads to new
empirical implications, potentially testable, that the other available theories cannot
explain. For example, in an extension in which the proposal power is controlled by a
committee of legislators instead of a single legislator, our theory identi￿es a positive
correlation between the committee size and the size of a supermajority of legislators
who receive positive bene￿ts in equilibrium. Such a positive correlation is consistent
with the date set of Knight (2005).
There is a growing literature, based on dynamic extensions of the Baron-Ferejohn
model, that explores policy dynamics in an environment where the status quo in one
period is endogenously determined by the policy chosen in the previous period (Baron
1996; Kalandrakis, 2004, 2007; Bowen and Zahran, 2007; Battaglini and Coate, 2007,
2008). A common feature in our model and this literature is that the status quo,
or the default policy, endogenously evolves. However, our model is not a dynamic
extension of the Baron-Ferejohn model, but instead it should be interpreted as an
alternative model of policy choice for the stage game in a dynamic setup. For example,
Diermeier and Fong (2008a, 2008c) apply the model presented in this paper to study,
respectively, the ratchet e⁄ect of government spending in multiparty parliamentary
countries and the policy dynamics in new democracies.
Our paper is also linked to the literature on stationary equilibria in dynamic
games. Notice that a stationary equilibrium for dynamic legislative bargaining with an
endogenous default need not exist, and, if it does, it is usually associated with mixed
strategies as is the case in, e.g., Kalandrakis (2004; 2007), Fong (2006), Battaglini and
iments (McKelvey, 1991; FrØchette, Kagel, and Lehrer, 2003; Diermeier and Gailmard, 2006; and
Battaglini and Palfrey, 2007) or using ￿eld data from the U.S. Congress (Knight, 2005), a common
￿nding in these studies is that proposal power is indeed valuable but not as much as predicted by
the theory.
7Palfrey (2007), and Bowen and Zahran (2007). Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007) prove
general existence of a pure-strategy stationary equilibrium for this class of dynamic
games, but only with some suitably assumed randomness on preferences and the
dynamic process of the status quo. Although our model does not satisfy the su¢ cient
conditions of Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007), we show that a class of pure-strategy
stationary equilibria still exists if the probability that a passed bill can be reconsidered
is su¢ ciently high. Therefore, our model is tractable for general characterization and
can be easily applied to dynamic models or embedded in a speci￿c economic context.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 de￿nes a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. Section 4 illustrates the key
mechanism and intuition of the model in a special case with three players. Section 5
provides general characterization of all pure-strategy stationary equilibria, and show
that the results for a game with three players can be generalized for a game with
an arbitrary odd number of players. Section 6 identi￿es a di⁄erent class of mixed-
strategy equilibria and discusses the issue of equilibrium selection. Section 7 presents
an extension of the model, in which a committee of legislators, instead of a single
proposer, is granted proposal power. Section 8 concludes and ￿nally, the Appendix
includes all the proofs.
2 The Model
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be a set of n players in the legislature, where n = 2m + 1 and
m 2 N: The legislature must decide on how to divide ￿ units of total bene￿ts among
the players, where ￿ 2 N is exogenously given. The policy space is ￿nite and denoted






‘=1 x‘ = ￿
￿
:3 Given any policy x = (x1;x2;:::;xn) 2 X;
3Recently, the assumption of a discrete policy space has become more popular in political economy
models of coalition formation. For examples, see Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo (2006), Dekel, Jackson
8player ‘ 2 N receives x‘ units of bene￿ts and derives a utility of u‘ (x) = x‘:
There is one proposer in the legislature. Assume this position is occupied by
player 1: The proposer is conferred the sole power to make policy proposals from the
policy space during the legislative session. All other players, i 2 Nnf1g; are referred
to as voters.
The legislature selects a policy over the course of potentially in￿nite rounds of
proposal making, where the number of rounds depends on exogenous factors and the
decision made by the proposer. Activities prior to each round t 2 N establish a
default policy xt￿1 2 X: In each round t; once reached, the proposer can choose to
make a proposal yt 2 X or pass the proposal round. A "pass" means inaction by
the proposer and, for mathematical convenience, is modeled as a proposal yt = xt￿1:
The proposal, once made, is then put to an immediate vote against xt￿1: If it is
approved by majority rule, it replaces xt￿1 as the default policy and xt = yt: If it is
not approved, the default policy remains the same and xt = xt￿1: As the legislative
session commences, an initial default x0 2 X is exogenously given. The initial default
is interpreted as the policy that has been enacted prior to the legislative session. The
policy that survives as default till the end of the legislative session is implemented.
How the legislative session would end is described below. Whereas Bernheim et al.
(2006) assume a ￿xed number of proposal rounds, in the model considered here the last
proposal round is not predetermined. We say the legislative session ends endogenously
after proposal round t; if the default xt established by the ￿rst t rounds of proposal
making and voting is such that the proposer will choose to pass any possible proposal
and Wolinsky (2008), and Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008a,b). This modeling choice is usually
motivated by technical convenience. Substantively, a discrete policy space limits the extent to which
utilities are transferable among the players. From the perspective of modeling real-life distributive
politics, the assumption seems innocuous, as, e.g. entitlement programs and the allocation of local
transportation and infrastructure projects, usually involve a minimal spending unit, even if it is very
small, say a dollar.
9round t0 > t: In addition, after any proposal round the legislative session may be
terminated exogenously with probability 1￿￿; where ￿ 2 [0;1) is the probability that
the proposer will have an opportunity to reconsider the policy that emerges from
the current round. We interpret ￿ as a parameter of the legislative institution, since
various congressional rules, unmodeled here, may a⁄ect the likelihood of chances for
reconsideration.4 For example, the case of ￿ = 0 is associated with one-round closed-
rule legislative bargaining (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989).
This paper focuses on institutions in the limiting case with ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large.
Diermeier and Fong (2008b) presents a variant of the model with a continuous-
time framework where a policy, once enacted, is in e⁄ect until it is reformed through
the political process. With a single, permanent proposer that model shares the same
mathematical structure as the one presented here.
3 Equilibrium De￿nition
We focus the analysis on stationary Markov perfect equilibria.5 In any proposal
round t 2 N; the only payo⁄-relevant state variable is the prevailing default, which
will be the policy outcome if it is not replaced by any new proposal in the rest of the
legislative session. The legislature thus faces an identical collective choice problem
in proposal rounds t1 and t2 6= t1; if the prevailing defaults in those two rounds are
identical. Stationarity implies that the players condition their strategies only on the
prevailing default. From now on, we drop the subscript t for the proposal round from
the notations.
4In principle, the probability of session continuation needs not be stationary over proposal rounds.
For example, in the ￿nite-period model of Bernheim et al. (2006), ￿t = 1 for all t < T; and ￿t = 0
for all t ￿ T; where T is the ￿xed number of proposal rounds.
5See Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) for justi￿cations of sta-
tionary equilibria in legislative bargaining games. See Maskin and Tirole (2001) for more general
discussions.
10Let P (X) be the space of probability measures over the policy space X; and
￿ : X ! P (X) be the proposal strategy of the proposer.6 In particular, ￿ (x;y)
denotes the probability that the proposer proposes a policy y 2 X when the prevailing
default is x 2 X:
Let U‘ (x) be the expected utility of player ‘ if the prevailing default is x: With
probability 1 ￿ ￿ the legislative session is exogenously terminated after the current
proposal round and this player receives a utility of u‘ (y): With probability ￿ the
proposer has a chance to reconsider the approved policy and makes a new proposal
according to policy rule f: In this case, player ‘ receives a continuation utility of
U‘ (f (x)): Thus,
U‘ (x) = (1 ￿ ￿)u‘ (x) + ￿U‘ (f (x)): (1)
We refer to U‘ : X ! R as the value function of player ‘:
We make two technical assumptions regarding how the players break indi⁄erence.
First, any player votes against a policy proposal if and only if passage of the pro-
posal makes him strictly worse o⁄. Second, the proposer never proposes any shift in
policy that is destined to be vetoed by a majority of voters. None of our qualitative
results depend on the ￿rst assumption. The second one simpli￿es the notation, but
is otherwise innocuous since making a losing proposal is equivalent to remaining at
the prevailing default.
In each proposal round, the proposer selects a policy proposal to maximize his
expected utility. A policy is politically feasible if, as a proposal it would be approved
by a majority of players. By the second assumption above, the maximization prob-
lem of the proposer is subject to the constraint of political feasibility. By the ￿rst
6A pure-strategy equilibium can be a focal point for the game considered here due to its simplicity.
See Diermeier and Fong (2008a) for characterization and comparison of pure-strategy and mixed-
strategy equilibria for related game with distributive politics.
11assumption above, the feasibility constraint is equivalent to an incentive compatibil-
ity constraint that requires that a majority of players are weakly better o⁄ with the
proposal policy than with the prevailing default. To sum up, given any default x 2 X;





s:t: jf‘ 2 N : U‘ (y) ￿ U‘ (x)gj ￿ m + 1;
(2)
where, for any ￿nite set A; jAj denotes the number of its elements. We are now ready
to de￿ne an equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 A stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is a proposal strategy ￿ and
a set of value functions fU‘g
n
‘=1 such that:
1. Given ￿; fU‘g
n
‘=1 solve the equation system de￿ned by (??).
2. Given fU‘g
n
‘=1 ; ￿ (x;y) > 0 only if y 2 X solves problem (2) of the proposer
with a default x 2 X:
Taking any stationary Markov perfect equilibrium with proposal strategy ￿; we
introduce some useful notations and impose additional requirements on the equilibria
we characterize in this paper. A policy x 2 X is stable in equilibrium if ￿ (x;x) = 1;
i.e., it persists as default with probability one. Let S ￿ fx 2 X : ￿ (x;x) = 1g be the
set of all stable policies, or the stable set. Denote the ideal policy of player ‘ 2 N
by s‘ 2 X; where s‘
‘ = ￿ and s‘
i = 0 for all i 2 Nnf‘g: As the proposer would never
make a new proposal to replace his ideal policy as default, the stable set is nonempty
and s1 2 S: We impose a notion of symmetry on the solution concept and restrict
attention to equilibria where the stable set is symmetric with respect to all voters, i.e.,
12if x 2 S and y 2 X is such that, for some i;j 2 Nnf1g; yi = xj; yj = xi; and y‘ = x‘
for all ‘ 2 Nnfi;jg; then y 2 S:
Let fxtg
1
t=0 be any sequence of policies such that ￿ (xt￿1;xt) > 0 for all t 2 N:
This policy path traces the evolution of default along some equilibrium path starting
from an initial default x0 2 X: We further restrict attention to equilibria where any
policy path induced by ￿ converges, i.e., for all x0 2 X; there exists T (x0) 2 N such
that ￿ (xt;xt) = 1 for all t ￿ T (x0) and all equilibrium policy paths fxtg
1
t=0 : With
the policy space considered here, there exist equilibria where the policy path does not
converge for some initial default.7 Along those equilibrium paths, in every proposal
round the proposer makes a new policy proposal with positive probability and policy
making continues until the legislative session is exogenously terminated. Given that
we assume a single persistent proposer, it is natural to rule out the equilibria with
nonconvergent policy paths.
De￿nition 2 A legislative equilibrium is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
where the stable set is symmetric with respect to voters and every policy path induced
by the equilibrium proposal strategy converges.
The main contribution of this paper is based on full characterization of pure-
strategy legislative equilibria for all ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large. A proposal strategy
￿ is a pure strategy if there exists a policy rule, f : X ! X; such that ￿ (x;f (x)) = 1
for all x 2 X: The existence of a pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
for the game considered here is not speci￿c to the particular distributive policy space
assumed in this paper. Diermeier and Fong (2008b) prove the existence of, and pro-












= 1; and ￿
￿
s3;s2￿
= 1: Suppose x0 = s2: Then the policy alternates between s3 in odd
periods and s2 in even periods until the legislative session is exogenously terminated.
13pose an algorithm to construct, a pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
for the game with a single proposer and the possibility of reconsideration, given any
￿nite policy space and any ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large.8
In any legislative equilibrium with a policy rule f; the stable set is
S = fx 2 X : f (x) = xg:
For any x0 2 X; let fft (x0)g
1
t=0 be such that f0 (x0) = x0 and ft (x0) = f (ft￿1 (x0))
for all t 2 N: Since any policy path induced by f converges in a legislative equilibrium,
let f1 (x0) ￿ limt!1 ft (x0): By de￿nition, f1 (x0) 2 S: We will call f1 (x0) the ￿nal
policy outcome if the legislative session lasts for su¢ ciently many proposal rounds so
that in realization the stable set is reached.
A preliminary analysis shows that, except for rare cases, the policy outcome in any
equilibrium for a one-round closed-rule legislative bargaining game cannot be the ￿nal
policy outcome in a pure-strategy legislative equilibrium for the game that allows the
possibility of reconsideration. Intuitively, this means that allowing reconsideration
fundamentally changes the set of equilibria compared to the model of Baron and
Ferejohn (1989a). This observation is summarized in the ￿rst proposition. The proof
is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Let b f (x) be the policy rule in any legislative equilibrium for the
game with ￿ = 0: Assume ￿ > 0 and take any x0 2 X such that b f (x0) 6= s1: Then in
any legislative equilibrium with policy rule f; f1 (x0) 6= b f (x0):
8A pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, in general, needs not exist in dynamic
games that involve coalition formation. For example, see Fong (2006) and Kalandrakis (2004; 2007)
for dynamic legislative bargaining games where the status quo is endogenously determined and no
pure-strategy stationary equilibrium exists.
144 A Legislature with Three Players
This section considers a legislature with three players. This special case illustrates the
key mechanism of the model with transparency. General results are presented in later
sections. Proposition 2 constructs and characterizes a class of legislative equilibria
for a three-player legislature. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Assume n = 3; X = ￿3
￿; and ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large. For all
functions e : X ! Z+ such that, for all x 2 X; minfx2;x3g ￿ e(x) ￿ 1
2 (x2 + x3);
there exists a legislative equilibrium with policy rule f such that, for all x 2 X;
f1 (x) = ￿ ￿ 2e(x) and f2 (x) = f3 (x) = e(x):
This proposition has several important implications. First, in equilibrium the
proposer receives no less than his bene￿t entitlement by default. In other words,
f1 (x) ￿ x1: Second, in equilibrium a policy is stable if and only if both voters receive
the same amount of bene￿ts from the policy. In other words, S = fx 2 X : x2 = x3g:
Third, the proposer always proposes a stable policy immediately, and reconsidera-
tion never occurs on the equilibrium path. In other words, f (x) 2 S for all x 2 X:
The possibility of reconsideration, however, changes equilibrium proposal making
and voting. Fourth, the two voters receive the same amount of bene￿ts in equilib-
rium, and this amount is no less than the default bene￿t entitlement of the voter
who receives less bene￿ts from the default among the two voters. In other words,
f2 (x) = f3 (x) ￿ minfx2;x3g: Crucially, this implies that the voter whose vote is not
needed to pass the new policy is not fully expropriated by the proposer. In fact, the
proposer can expropriate at most maxfx2;x3g￿minfx2;x3g units of the bene￿ts. As
a consequence, in equilibrium the bene￿t level received by the proposer is bounded
above by ￿￿2minfx2;x3g; and this is smaller than ￿￿minfx2;x3g; the proposer￿ s
15bene￿ts in the case of legislative bargaining where reconsideration is not allowed.
The equilibrium proposal strategy can intuitively be described as follows: the
proposer seeks voting support from the voter with a lower reservation value and
expropriates the other voter to the extent that the two voters receive the same amount
of bene￿ts. In a dynamic setup with an evolving default, however, it is not necessarily
trivial to assess which voter is the cheaper one to satisfy.9 In our case the critical voter
is the one who receives less from the default. To see why, consider any x 2 X such that
x2 < x3: Since x2 ￿ e(x) < x3; the reservation values of players 2 and 3 are calculated
as U2 (x) = (1 ￿ ￿)x2 + ￿e(x) 2 (e(x) ￿ 1;e(x)] and U3 (x) = (1 ￿ ￿)x3 + ￿e(x) >
e(x); given that ￿ 2 (0;1) is su¢ ciently large. In equilibrium, the proposer o⁄ers
e(x) units of bene￿ts to both voters. Among all stable policies, this is the one that
just satis￿es player 2 by her reservation value and maximizes the expected utility of
the proposer.
Why does the proposer have to o⁄er both voters an equal amount of bene-
￿ts? Suppose that the proposer o⁄ers e(x) units of bene￿ts to player 2 but only
some k < e(x) units to player 3: It is obvious that player 3 will vote against the
proposal since her bene￿t level is reduced. But so will player 2: To understand
why, consider counterfactually, what would happen if player 2 approved the policy
y = (￿ ￿ e(x) ￿ k;e(x);k): With probability 1 ￿ ￿ the legislative session would end
immediately and y would be implemented. With probability ￿; however, the pro-
poser would have a chance to reconsider the policy issue and propose a new policy
f (y) = (￿ ￿ 2e(y);e(y);e(y)) according to his equilibrium strategy. This policy
makes player 3 at least as well o⁄ as with y and therefore would be approved by
majority voting. Since e(y) ￿ 1
2 (e(x) + k) < e(x); by voting for policy y player
9For example, Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo (2006) use backward induction to identify the set of
voters from whom an agenda setter optimally seeks voting support.
162 would be worse o⁄ when the policy is reconsidered. Anticipating such an adverse
consequence, player 2 will always vote against the proposal of y; even though she
receives e(x) ￿ x2 units of bene￿ts from this policy. By this argument, player 2
will not allow the proposer to expropriate the other voter too much so that, in the
subsequent proposal rounds, the other voter will have a lower reservation value than
hers and look more attractive for the proposer to ally with. As a consequence, the
best the proposer can achieve is to o⁄er both voters equal amount of bene￿ts and
just satisfy the voter who is given less by the default.
Although the voters derive utilities only from the bene￿ts they receive, in equi-
librium they have indirect preferences over the distribution of bene￿ts. In the above
example, player 2 strictly prefers (￿ ￿ 2e(x);e(x);e(x)) to (￿ ￿ e(x) ￿ k;e(x);k);
where k < e(x); even though either policy, if realized, gives her e(x) units of bene￿ts.
Through the dynamic link of an evolving default, the allocation of bene￿ts a⁄ects the
distribution of bargaining power in the rest of the legislative session.
Therefore, the two voters e⁄ectively demand a more egalitarian allocation of re-
sources between them. In particular, any voter does not allow the other voter to be
su¢ ciently expropriated by the proposer. This demand for "fairer allocations" results
from self-interested voters who want to improve their long-term bargaining positions.
It does not depend on primitive preferences for fair allocations or risk aversion.10
On the other hand, the proposer has an incentive to expropriate as much as pos-
sible. The proposer proposes less bene￿ts for himself compared to the case without
reconsideration because mutual protection between the voters imposes endogenous
constraints on the set of policies that can be approved by majority voting in equi-
librium. As a consequence, the proposer has limited ability to expropriate the voter
10In a model of collective decision over legislative procedures, this insight may have implications
for the existence of minority rights and bene￿ts in legislatures.
17whose vote is not needed.
Notice also that, compared to the case without reconsideration, granting the pro-
poser the power to reconsider reduces his equilibrium payo⁄. Therefore, a proposer
would have an incentive to commit not to reconsider a passed bill. In the model
considered here such a promise would not be credible.
Depending on the initial default, the proposer may not be the one who receives
the most bene￿ts in equilibrium. Indeed, he may be the player who gets the least
amount. This, for example, happens if the proposer already receives the least bene￿ts
by the initial default. For example, assume ￿ = 10 and the initial default is (1;4;5):
The unique equilibrium policy outcome then is (2;4;4):
Proposition 2 also implies the existence of multiple legislative equilibria. In par-
ticular, for any x 2 X such that jx2 ￿ x3j ￿ 2; di⁄erent values of e(x) are permissible.
Consider a numerical example with ￿ = 6: Assume the initial default is x = (2;1;3)
and discuss two possibilities. First, suppose everyone believes that, if the default
x = (2;1;3) remains and the legislative session continues, policy y1 = (4;1;1) will
be proposed and approved in the next proposal round. Given this expectation, the
reservation values of players 2 and 3 are calculated as U2 (x) = (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ = 1 and
U3 (x) = 3(1 ￿ ￿)+￿ > 1: The proposer then has to o⁄er both voters 1 unit of bene￿ts
to obtain a vote from player 2; and y1 is the optimal choice for him. The fact that
the proposer proposes y1 when facing the default x is consistent with the common
belief of the players. Second, suppose instead everyone believes that, if the default
x = (2;3;1) remains and the legislative session continues, policy y2 = (2;2;2) will
be proposed and approved in the next proposal round. Given this expectation, the
reservation values of players 2 and 3 are calculated as U2 (x) = (1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿ 2 (1;2)
and U2 (x) = 3(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿ 2 (2;3): The proposer then has to o⁄er both voters 2
units of bene￿ts to obtain a vote from player 2; and y2 is the optimal choice for him.
18The equilibrium proposal strategy thus is consistent with the common belief of the
players.
The two possible equilibrium policy outcomes in this example are y1 = (4;1;1) and
y2 = (2;2;2): In the former equilibrium, the proposer expropriates 2 units of bene￿ts
from the voter whose vote is not needed to pass the equilibrium policy, whereas in
the latter he is not able to increase his bene￿t entitlement. In both cases the value of
proposal power is constrained compared to that implied by the closed-rule legislative
bargaining game.
The existence of multiple equilibria is driven by self-ful￿lling expectations.11 How
beliefs are coordinated goes beyond the scope of this paper. In principle, legislators
may have channels to communicate with one another through policy deliberation or
in private occasions before the o¢ cial legislative procedures.
The multiplicity of equilibria is inherent in the discrete policy space. All the
equilibria characterized in Proposition 2 are stable and robust to trembles. Moreover,
the mechanism of mutual protection by the voters relies on the condition that there
is not a predetermined last proposal round, so none of the legislative equilibria in the
proposition can be supported in a model with ￿nite proposal rounds. Therefore, a
￿nite-round model cannot be applied to re￿ne the equilibria.
The next proposition focuses on the ￿nal policy outcome in equilibrium and char-
acterizes necessary conditions for all pure-strategy legislative equilibria, including the
ones where reconsideration actually occurs.12 The proof is presented in the Appendix.
11See Hassler et al. (2003) for another example of self-ful￿lling multiple equilibria in a political
economy model with a redistributive policy and repeated voting.
12Here is one example in which a passed policy may be reconsidered along some equilibrium path.
Assume n = 3; ￿ = 2 and X = ￿3
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19Proposition 3 Assume n = 3; X = ￿3
￿; and ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large. Any
legislative equilibrium with policy rule f must be such that, for all x 2 X; f1
2 (x) =
f1
3 (x) ￿ minfx2;x3g and x1 ￿ f1
1 (x) ￿ x1 + maxfx2;x3g ￿ minfx2;x3g:
Implied by Proposition 3, the endogenous constraint on proposal power imposed
by mutual protection of the voters is characteristic of all pure-strategy legislative
equilibria. Even in the equilibrium where proposal power has maximal strength, i.e.,
f1
1 (x) = x1+maxfx2;x3g￿minfx2;x3g; the proposer still receives strictly less than
what he would do in closed-rule legislative bargaining, i.e., x1 + maxfx2;x3g: The
insight holds no matter which equilibrium occurs.
Proposition 3 also identi￿es the bounds on the ￿nal policy outcome resulting from
any initial default. Observe that any possible ￿nal policy outcome can be supported
in some pure-strategy legislative equilibrium described in Proposition 2. Therefore,
Proposition 2 presents all pure-strategy legislative equilibria where no reconsideration
occurs. With the focus on the equilibrium allocation of the bene￿ts and the value of
proposal power, a full characterization of all those equilibria is su¢ cient.
5 General Results
This section presents results for the game with an arbitrary odd number of players.
Some additional notations facilitate the exposition. Fix any x 2 ￿n
￿: For any k 2
Z+; let Q(x;k) ￿ fi 2 Nnf1g : xi = kg be the collection of all voters who receive
exactly k units of bene￿ts from policy x: For any K 2 Z+; the subset
SK
k=0 Q(x;k)
of players thus includes all and only voters who receive no more than K units of




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ r: In words, zr (x) denotes the bene￿ts received from policy x by
the voter who is in the r-th place from bottom if all voters are ranked according to
20their bene￿t entitlement.
The ￿rst theorem establishes the existence of a pure-strategy legislative equilib-
rium and characterizes a class of equilibria where no reconsideration occurs. The
proof is presented in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 Assume ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large. For any function e : X ! Z+ such
that zm (x) ￿ e(x) ￿
￿￿x1
m+1 for all x 2 X; there exists a legislative equilibrium in
which:
1. The policy rule f can be constructed by the following algorithm. Step A.
For all x 2 X; take a coalition Mf (x) of voters such that jMf (x)j = m and
Mf (x) ￿
Se(x)
k=0 Q(x;k): Such a coalition exists since e(x) ￿ zm (x): Step B.
Take any voter if (x) 2 Nn(Mf (x) [ f1g) and let M
+




> > > > <
> > > > :
￿ ￿ (m + 1)e(x); if ‘ = 1;






k=0 S (k); where S (0) ￿ fs1g and, for all k 2 N;
S (k) ￿ fx 2 X : Q(x;k) = m + 1 and Q(x;0) = m ￿ 1g:
3. For all x 2 X; f (x) 2 S:
4. For all x 2 X and for all i 6= 1 such that Ui (f (x)) ￿ Ui (x); fi (x) ￿ zm (x):
5. For all x 2 X; x1 ￿ f1 (x) ￿ ￿ ￿ (m + 1)zm (x):
21Part 1 of the theorem presents the form of an equilibrium policy rule. Recall
that the legislature consists of 2m + 1 players, and the proposer only needs m votes
from the voters to pass a new policy. However, in equilibrium a group of m + 1
voters receive positive amounts of bene￿ts. This implies that one voter whose vote
is not necessary for approval of the policy is not fully expropriated by the proposer.
Moreover, all these m + 1 voters receive the same amount of bene￿ts in equilibrium,
despite their possibly di⁄erentiated bene￿t allocations in the initial default.
The algorithm to construct a policy rule also implies the existence of multiple leg-
islative equilibria. The multiplicity is due to self-ful￿lling expectations, as explained
in the case with three players. For a numerical example, assume n = 5 (m = 2) and
￿ = 10: Consider an initial default x0 = (0;1;2;3;4): The possible equilibrium out-
comes then include (4;2;2;2;0); (4;2;2;0;2); (1;3;3;3;0); (1;3;3;0;3); (1;3;0;3;3)
and (1;0;3;3;3): These equilibria are associated with e(x0) 2 f2;3g; and the pro-
poser receives 4 units or 1 unit of bene￿ts, respectively.
Part 2 of the theorem characterizes the stable set in equilibrium. The ideal policy
of the proposer, s1; is obviously stable. For any other stable policy, a group of m+1
voters receive an equal and positive amount of the bene￿ts whereas the other m ￿ 1
voters receive nothing. The intuition for these policies to be stable is crucial to
understand the mechanism of the model.
Consider an initial default x0 2 S (K) for some K 2 N: By de￿nition of S (K);
there is a group Q(x0;K) of m + 1 voters who receive K units of bene￿ts by default
and all the other m ￿ 1 voters get nothing. In order to pass any new policy, the
proposer must obtain at least one vote from voters in Q(x0;K): A critical observation
is that any voter i 2 Q(x0;K) does not accept any policy proposal such that the
proposer increases his own bene￿t entitlement but some other voter j 2 Q(x0;K) is
expropriated and given strictly less than K units of bene￿ts. Suppose counterfactually





j = K: Then in the second proposal round, once reached, the proposer would
obtain enough votes from a group of m voters in
Szm(x1)
k=0 Q(x1;k) and pass a policy
x2 = f (x1) that permanently reduces bene￿t entitlement of any voter i 2 Q(x0;K)
from the level of K units. This is true since x2







m+1 = K: As a consequence, in the very ￿rst proposal round no
voter i 2 Q(x0;K) would allow the proposer to expropriate any other voter in the
same group. Thus, the proposer cannot do better than allow the initial default to
persist. In equilibrium, all voters in the coalition of Q(x0;K) protect the bene￿ts for
one another.
The same intuition applies for any initial default. Any voter i accepts a policy
x￿ 2 X only if, with x￿ as default, the number of voters who look more attractive
for the proposer as potential future allies is less than m: This follows because in the
future the proposer may use his power to exploit i along with the voters with lower
reservation values than i:
Part 3 of the theorem indicates that the proposer always proposes a stable policy
and reconsideration never occurs in these equilibria. Parts 4 says that every voter who
votes for the equilibrium policy must receive no less than the bene￿t entitlement of the
voter who is ranked the m-th from the bottom according default bene￿t entitlement.
Part 5 shows the bounds on the equilibrium bene￿t entitlement of the proposer.
In a legislative equilibrium described in Theorem 1, a policy proposal is usually not
symmetric to the voters. In other words, voters who receive the same from the default
may be treated unequally by the proposer. This is evident in the following numerical
example. Assume n = 5 and ￿ = 50: Consider a default x = (10;10;10;10;10):
The proposer needs two votes from the voters to pass a new policy but cannot fully
expropriate the other two. That said, the proposer has to o⁄er three out of four
23voters 10 units of bene￿ts and expropriates the fourth. Therefore, he can play a
pure strategy and propose any policy yi 2 X for some i 6= 1 such that yi
1 = 20;
yi
i = 0; and yi
‘ = 10 for all j 2 Nnf1;ig: With any of these policies, voter i; whose
identity is common knowledge, is targeted for expropriation. Intuitively, imagine that
in equilibrium a group of voters, for example players 2; 3; and 4; form a coalition and
commit to protect the bene￿ts for one another. They will not accept any policy with
which as default any of their coalition members would be eventually o⁄ered less than
10 units of bene￿ts. Given this, the proposer can only expropriate player 5: The
commitment is credible since voters in this formed coalition are weakly better o⁄
keeping their promises given any best response of the proposer.
One may ask whether randomization of policies fyig
5
i=2 is also a possible equilib-
rium strategy. Such randomization treats all voters equally and anonymously, but it
cannot constitute an equilibrium strategy. Suppose all players anticipate that if the
default x remains the proposer will play a mixed strategy and randomize the policies
fyig
5
i=2 in the subsequent proposal round. Then the reservation value of any voter





and 7 < Uj (x) < 8 for ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently
large. Therefore, the proposer can pass any policy zi for some i 6= 1 such that zi
1 = 26;
zi
i = 0; and zi
j = 8 for all j 2 Nnf1;ig: The expectations of the players are thus not
consistent with the equilibrium strategy. Similarly, if all players anticipate that the
proposer will randomize the policies fzig
5
i=2 in the next proposal round as the default
x remains, then the reservation values of all voters would turn out to be even smaller
so that the proposer could pass a more expropriating policy than any of fzig
5
i=2 : This
analysis hints a possibility of a mixed-strategy legislative equilibrium in which the
proposer is able to capture a substantial portion of the total bene￿ts in equilibrium.
A characterization of such an equilibrium along with the issue of equilibrium selection
is provided in Section 6.
24The next theorem characterizes the necessary conditions in any pure-strategy
legislative equilibrium and focuses on the ￿nal policy outcome. The proof is presented
in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 Assume ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large. Any legislative equilibrium with
policy rule f must be such that, for all x 2 X; f1 (x) 2
S1
k=0 S (k) and x1 ￿
f1
1 (x) ￿ ￿ ￿ (m + 1)zm (x):
The theorem identi￿es the bounds on the ￿nal policy outcome resulting from
any initial default. In cases in which proposal power has its maximal strength, i.e.,
f1
1 (x) = ￿￿(m + 1)zm (x); the proposer still receives unambiguously less than what
he would get in closed-rule legislative bargaining. Therefore, in all pure-strategy
legislative equilibria a group of voters implicitly coordinate to support each other
against the sole proposer. Also observe that any possible ￿nal policy outcome can
be supported in some pure-strategy legislative equilibrium described in Theorem 1.
Therefore, Theorem 1 presents all pure-strategy legislative equilibria where no re-
consideration occurs. With the focus on the equilibrium bene￿t allocation, a full
characterization of all those equilibria thus is su¢ cient.
6 Mixed-Strategy Legislative Equilibrium
In addition to the pure-strategy legislative equilibria, there exists a class of legislative
equilibria with mixed proposal strategies. In those equilibria, if the legislative session
continues for at least two proposal rounds, it is guaranteed that the proposer takes
all the bene￿ts and leaves nothing to the others, regardless of the initial default.
The sole proposer has nearly dictatorial power, and the equilibrium policy outcome
is reminiscent of those in Bernheim et al. (2006) and Kalandrakis (2004, 2007). The
25next proposition presents results for a legislature with three players. The proof is
presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 Assume n = 3; X = ￿3













1; if y = s1;
0; if y 6= s1:
2. For any x 2 X such that x2x3 6= 0;
￿ (x;y) =
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2￿ (x2 + x3)




2￿ (x2 + x3)
; if y = (x1;0;￿ ￿ x1);
0; otherwise,
and Ui (x) < xi for all i 6= 1:
This proposition describes the mixed proposal strategy. In words, the proposer
is able to pass his ideal policy right away if at least one voter receives nothing by
default. Otherwise, the proposer manipulates the sequence of proposals so that he is
able to pass his ideal policy in the second proposal round, if the legislative session
reaches it. In the interim proposal round, i.e., the ￿rst round, the proposer takes all
the bene￿ts from one voter to the other. This is done with randomization so that,
with positive probability, each voter may receive nothing according to the approved
policy in the ￿rst proposal round.
As an example, assume ￿ = 6 and consider a default (2;3;1): In the equilibrium







4; the proposer seeks








4; he seeks voting support from player 3; who is the voter
disadvantaged by the default. The proposer gives 2 units of the bene￿ts to himself,
and the other 4 units to whoever he chooses to ally with. The policy outcome at the
end of the ￿rst round is either (2;4;0) or (2;0;4): With probability ￿ the legislative
session continues and the proposer can pass his ideal policy (6;0;0): Observe that,
if both voters anticipate the mixed proposal strategies in the very beginning of the




: This sets the ground
for the proposer to randomize between the two voters.
The mixed-strategy equilibrium again is a result of self-ful￿lling expectations.
In equilibrium, regardless of the initial default, all players anticipate that, if the
default remains, the proposer will play mixed strategies and eventually implement
his ideal policy. Given such a common belief, both voters must have very small
reservation values so that they are willing to accept a policy proposal that delivers
very small expected utilities to them and eventually carries out their expectation.
This equilibrium thus exhibits an extreme form of the "power to propose".
Part 2 of Proposition 4 also implies that, except for rare cases in which the proposer
can immediately pass his ideal policy, both voters would be strictly better o⁄ if
the legislative bargaining game was not played and the initial default was directly
implemented. In the previous example, the value of the game for player i 6= 1 is




< xi given than ￿ 2 (0;1) is su¢ ciently large. This property plays
a crucial role when equilibrium selection is discussed later.
Mixed-strategy equilibria also exist, in a similar fashion, for a legislature with ￿ve
or more than ￿ve players.
Proposition 5 Assume odd n ￿ 5; X = ￿n
￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large. There
27exists a legislative equilibrium (￿;fU‘g
n
‘=1) such that the policy converges to the ideal
policy of the proposer after a transition of at most one proposal round. In particular:
1. For all x 2 X such that jQ(x;0)j ￿ m; ￿ (x;s1) = 1:
2. For all x 2 X such that jQ(x;0)j < m; ￿ (x;y) > 0 only if ￿ (y;s1) = 1:
Moreover, fi 6= 1 : Ui (x) < xig ￿ m + 1:
The same pattern of policy dynamics is identi￿ed in a mixed-strategy stationary
equilibrium constructed by Kalandrakis (2007) for a dynamic legislative bargaining
model with an evolving default, an arbitrary odd n ￿ 5 players, an arbitrary ￿ 2
(0;1); an arbitrary probability for proposer selection, and a continuous distributive
policy space. In fact, the technique in the proof of his Proposition 2 can be applied
to the model considered here with a ￿nite policy space. The proof of our Proposition
5 is thus omitted.
Whereas the class of equilibria ￿rst identi￿ed in the continuous model of Kalan-
drakis (2004, 2007) is also prevalent in our model with a discrete policy space, the
reverse is not true. The pure-strategy equilibria with mutual protection among the
voters cannot be supported as a stationary equilibrium in the model of Kalandrakis.
So far two classes of legislative equilibria have been established. In one class of
legislative equilibria, the proposer plays a pure proposal strategy and a group of voters
protect the bene￿ts for one another in order to secure their bargaining positions in
the subsequent proposal rounds. The value of proposal power is thus constrained. In
the other class of legislative equilibria, the proposer plays mixed proposal strategies
and has nearly dictatorial power. These equilibria display contrasting features.
The obvious next question is: Whether and on what grounds can we select between
the two classes of equilibria?
28We argue that the pure-strategy legislative equilibria should be the ones to be
observed. In legislatures the policy making process is typically proceeded by a proce-
dural stage where the legislature decides on whether to deliberate on a given policy
issue. If a majority of legislators believe that they would be strictly worse o⁄ once
legislative actions are taken on a certain policy issue, they can block the legislation on
this policy in the procedural stage. This is the case if they expect a mixed-strategy
legislative equilibrium in the legislative bargaining game.
Formally, consider an augmented game with one additional stage before legislative
bargaining begins. In that pre-bargaining stage, an initial default x0 2 X is exoge-
nously given and the identity of proposer (e.g., player 1) in the bargaining stage has
been known to the legislature. The legislature must decide by majority rule whether
or not to enter the legislative bargaining process described in Section 2. The choice
is denoted by ￿ 2 f0;1g: If ￿ = 1; then the legislative bargaining game commences.
Instead if ￿ = 0; then the legislative session ends immediately and the initial default
x0 is implemented. Propositions 4 and 5 assert that, in the mixed-strategy equilibria
where the proposer has nearly dictatorial power, more than one-half of the voters are
better o⁄ with the initial default than with the equilibrium policy outcome of the
legislative bargaining game. Therefore, if the players anticipate that the proposer
will play expropriating mixed strategies, ￿ = 0 will be chosen by majority rule in
the pre-bargaining stage. In other words, conditional on the occurrence of legislative
bargaining over some policy issue, the ￿nal policy outcome should be consistent with
the prediction of some pure-strategy equilibrium but not a mixed-strategy one.
297 Committees as Proposers
In practice, a policy proposal may be made by a committee instead of a single legisla-
tor. This is well known in the case of the U.S. Congress. Knight (2005), for example,
describes how the House Committee of Transportation and Infrastructure e⁄ectively
controls agenda setting on certain bills that allocate the federal budget over local
transportation projects.
Our model can be extended to account for committees as proposers. Moreover,
we can address the question about how the size of a proposal committee may a⁄ect
the allocation of bene￿ts and the endogenous constraints on proposal power.
Let P ￿ N be the set of players in the proposal committee. So that the committee
members alone are not decisive in majority voting, assume p = jPj ￿ m: All the
other players are referred to as voters. The policy is made through a sequence of
proposal making and voting analogous to the one described in Section 2, with the
only exception that every proposal must be made by the proposal committee.
Proposal making itself is a collective decision in the committee. To simplify the
analysis, we ignore the distributional issue among committee members and treat the
whole committee as a single political actor that controls p votes and proposal power.
In other words, we assume that all committee members vote for any policy proposed
by the committee.13 After all, in a distributive setting all committee members have
aligned interests in expropriating the rest of the legislature to a maximal extent.
This assumption may be a good approximation for the data set of Knight (2005),
where almost every representative in the House Committee of Transportation and
Infrastructure receives a positive allocation of the federal budget for transportation
13Our qualitative results do not rely on this extreme simpli￿cation. The key insight holds as
long as the number of committee members who support the proposed policy is increasing in the
committee size, which is true if the proposal decision is made by a voting rule, e.g. simple majority.
30projects in his district.
The intuition developed in the baseline case with a single proposer can be carried
over to this extension with a proposal committee. Again, the focus is the voters￿
incentives. In order to pass any new policy, the committee, which already controls p
votes, requires m+1￿p additional votes from the voters. With ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently
large, any voter would not vote for a proposal if some other m + 1 ￿ p voters are
substantially expropriated by this proposal, because the expropriated voters in this
round would become the cheaper coalition partners for the committee members to
ally with in potential future proposal rounds. Therefore, the committee can only fully
expropriate up to m ￿ p voters, and a group of at least p voters whose votes are not
needed to approve the proposal must be o⁄ered positive bene￿ts by the new policy.
The next theorem formalizes this insight. To facilitate the exposition, let QP (x;k) ￿
fi 2 NnP : xi = kg be the collection of all voters who receive exactly k units of ben-
e￿ts from policy x: For any r 2 f1;2;:::;n ￿ pg; let zP





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ r denote the bene￿ts received from policy x by the voter who
ranked the r-th from the bottom if all voters are ranked according to their bene￿t
entitlement. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Theorem 3 Assume X = ￿n
￿; ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large, and a proposal committee
P with p members, where 1 ￿ p ￿ m: A pure-strategy legislative equilibrium exists.
Moreover, in any pure-strategy legislative equilibrium, for any default x 2 X; the ￿-





i ￿ ￿ ￿ (m + 1)zP
m+1￿p (x);
￿ ￿QP (x￿;0)
￿ ￿ = m ￿ p; and
￿ ￿QP (x￿;e￿)
￿ ￿ = m + 1 for some e￿ 2 Z+ such that
zP







: Notably, the number of players who receive a







￿ = m+1+p; which
is increasing in the size of the proposal committee.
31Theorem 3 implies that more than a bare majority of players receive positive ben-
e￿ts in equilibrium and the size of this supermajority can be large. Moreover, there is
a positive correlation between committee size p and the number of players who receive
a positive amount of bene￿ts in equilibrium. This is because, counterintuitively, a
larger proposal committee is endogenously constrained to o⁄er positive bene￿ts to a
larger fraction of the legislature. These features are absent in games with closed-rule
legislative bargaining, where regardless of the committee size, only a bare majority
of players, including all committee members, receive positive bene￿ts and all other
players get nothing.
The empirical implications of our extended model are potentially testable with
congressional data. For example, the positive correlation between committee size and
the number of players that receive positive bene￿ts is consistent with the observation
by Knight (2005). In 1991, the committee that controls proposal power includes 55
representatives and 46% of the districts receive a positive allocation of federal bud-
get earmarked for local transportation projects. In contrast, in 1998 the committee
includes 72 representatives and 82% of the districts receive a positive allocation. We
leave related empirical work for future research.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a new analytical framework of legislative bargaining. A
central idea is that policy making is ￿nalized only after all players with agenda control
have no more incentive to replace the default policy. The setup, we believe, captures
important features of legislative decision-making, such as an endogenous default and
the possibility of reconsideration without a predetermined last proposal round. We
characterize a class of pure-strategy equilibria in which a group of voters protect
32the bene￿ts for one another against the proposer. Thus the value of proposal power
is substantially constrained. The model is tractable and can be easily applied to
dynamic models or embedded in a speci￿c economic context, e.g. from public ￿nance.
There are various natural extensions of the model. An immediate next step of
research is to allow turnover of proposal power. This introduces a nontrivial trade-o⁄
between the incentive to protect and the incentive to exploit in a model with the
possibility of reconsideration. On one hand a voter has an incentive to defend the
bene￿ts of the other voters so as to secure her bargaining position as a future voter.
On the other hand, she may well have an opposite incentive to allow the current
proposer expropriating the other voters as much as possible since this will improve
her bargaining position as a future proposer. The former e⁄ect is the focus of this
paper whereas the latter is highlighted by Kalandrakis (2004; 2007). The interplay of
these e⁄ects can be studied in a more general model, possibly with random selection
of proposers. We conjecture that in such a model with a large number of legislators
the results presented in this paper would be likely to hold. As the probability for
a legislator to be chosen as proposer is decreasing in the size of the legislature, the
incentive to exploit would be dominated by the incentive to protect.
Another extension would be to incorporate a richer institutional structure into
the legislative process, e.g. the existence of a gatekeeper. We de￿ne a gatekeeper as
the player who is conferred the veto right to block any policy proposal made by some
others and at the same time able to propose a new policy in some situations. The
sequence of events in the game can be modi￿ed as follows. There is an initial default
and one player is randomly assigned to be a gatekeeper. The players then are able
to make policy proposals in turn. A player can choose to pass his turn if proposing
a policy does not make himself better o⁄. Once a proposal is made, it has to be
approved by the gatekeeper and then voted on against the default by majority rule.
33A passed proposal becomes the new default in future proposal rounds. Legislative
interaction ceases after all players pass their proposal turns. The ￿nal default policy
is then implemented. In a model like this, we would be able to compare the respective
values of proposal power and gatekeeping power. These institutional variations are
potentially important for a comparative study of legislative decision-making, as the
sole-proposer case is reminiscent of a cabinet in a parliamentary democracy while
universal proposing with a gatekeeper may be a good representation of decision-
making in the U.S. Congress.14
The analytical framework proposed in this paper could also be incorporated into
fuller developed models of public ￿nance and macroeconomic policy choice.15 As re-
cent empirical studies on political economy and comparative constitutions have estab-
lished various stylized facts and raised new questions about how political institutions
shape the dynamics of policy, we expect fruitful insights from such an approach.
14See Diermeier and Myerson (1994, 1999) for some early development of comparative models in
this direction.
15See Diermeier and Fong (2008a), for example, for an application of the model that accounts for
the patterns of government spending dynamics in multi-party parliamentary countries.
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Throughout the appendix we use the two additional notations de￿ned and explained
in Section 5. Fix any x 2 X: For all k 2 Z+; Q(x;k) ￿ fi 2 Nnf1g : xi = kg; and







Proof of Proposition 1. Step A. For ￿ = 0; in any legislative equilibrium
with policy rule b f; for any x 2 X there exists M (x) ￿ N such that jM (x)j = m;
Szm(x)￿1




￿ Q(x;zm (x)); and
b f‘ (x) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿ ￿
P
i2M(x) xi; if ‘ = 1;
x‘; if ‘ 2 M (x);
0; otherwise.
This is a standard result proved by Baron and Ferejohn (1989a). Step B. For any
￿ 2 [0;1); in any legislative equilibrium with policy rule f; f (s1) = s1 since U1 (x) <
U1 (s1) for all x 6= s1: Step C. Assume ￿ > 0 and consider any legislative equilibrium
with policy rule f: Suppose that there exists some x 2 X such that b f (x) 6= s1































words, in any proposal round with b f (x) as default, s1 is politically feasible and
strictly preferred to b f (x) by the proposer. This contradicts the supposition that
f1 (x) = b f (x).
Proof of Proposition 2. This proposition is a special case of Theorem 1 with m =
1: Consider the algorithm in Part 1 of Theorem 1. For any x 2 X; M
+
f (x) = f2;3g
is uniquely determined and z1 (x) = minfx2;x3g:
35Proof of Proposition 3. This proposition is a special case of Theorem 2 with
m = 1. For any k 2 N; if Q(x;k) = m + 1 then x2 = x3: Therefore, the equilibrium
stable set is S = fx 2 X : x2 = x3g:
Lemma 1 is useful for proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 Consider any legislative equilibrium (f;fU‘g
n
‘=1): For all x 2 X = ￿n
￿
and all ‘ 2 N:
1. U‘ (f (x)) ￿ U‘ (x) , U‘ (f (x)) ￿ x‘:
2. For ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large, f1
‘ (x) < x‘ ) U‘ (f (x)) < x‘:
Proof of Lemma 1. Take any x 2 X and any ‘ 2 N: Part 1 is obviously true,
since U‘ (x) = (1 ￿ ￿)x‘ + ￿U‘ (f (x)) by de￿nition. To prove Part 2, let T 2 N be
such that ft (x) = f1 (x) for all t ￿ T; and either T = 1 or ft+1 (x) 6= ft (x) for




‘ (x) + ￿
T￿1f1
‘ (x): Suppose that
f1
‘ (x) < x‘: Given that ￿ 2 (0;1) is su¢ ciently large, U‘ (f (x)) is su¢ ciently close
to f1
‘ (x) so that U‘ (f (x)) < x‘:
Proof of Theorem 1. Parts 2-5 are immediate implications of Part 1, which we
prove by construction and veri￿cation of an equilibrium.
Step A. Given the policy rule described in Part 1 of the theorem, we construct
the reservation value functions that satisfy the equation system de￿ned by (??). In
particular, for all x 2 S and all ‘ 2 N; U‘ (x) = x‘; for all x = 2 S;
U‘ (x) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(1 ￿ ￿)x1 + ￿ (￿ ￿ (m + 1)e(x)); if ‘ = 1;
(1 ￿ ￿)x‘ + ￿e(x); for all ‘ 2 Q(f (x);e(x));
(1 ￿ ￿)x‘; for all ‘ 2 Q(f (x);0):
36Step B. Given the reservation value functions constructed in Step A, we then
verify that, for any x 2 X; the policy rule described in Part 1 of the theorem solves
problem (2) of the proposer. Taking any x 2 X; we prove the optimality of f (x)
through a series of claims. Claim 1 shows that at least m voters weakly prefer f (x)
to x; so f (x) can be approved by majority voting if it is preferred and proposed
by the proposer. Claim 2 is an intermediate result useful in the subsequent claims.
Claim 3 shows that the proposer also weakly prefers f (x) to x: Claim 4 shows that
the proposer cannot be strictly better o⁄ by proposing any policy other than f (x):
CLAIM 1. There exists a coalition M of voters such that jMj = m and Ui (f (x)) ￿
Ui (x) for all i 2 M (x):
PROOF. This claim is trivial if x 2 S so assume that x = 2 S: Notice that, by the




and jMf (x)j = m: Since f (x) 2 S and Mf (x) ￿ Q(f (x);e(x)); Ui (f (x)) = fi (x) =
e(x) for all i 2 Mf (x): Since Mf (x) ￿
Se(x)
k=0 Q(x;k); xi ￿ e(x) for all i 2 Mf (x):
Thus Ui (f (x)) = e(x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)xi + ￿e(x) = Ui (x) for all i 2 Mf (x):
CLAIM 2. Suppose that x 2 S (k) for some k 2 Z+: Then U1 (x) = ￿￿(m + 1)k:
PROOF. This claim directly follows the de￿nition of S (k) and the construction
of U1 (x):
CLAIM 3. U1 (f (x)) ￿ U1 (x):
PROOF. This claim is trivial if x 2 S so assume that x = 2 S: Since f (x) 2
S (e(x)); U1 (f (x)) = ￿ ￿ (m + 1)e(x) by Claim 2. Since e(x) ￿
￿￿x1
m+1; U1 (f (x)) ￿
x1: By Lemma 1, U1 (f (x)) ￿ U1 (x):
CLAIM 4. For all y 2 X; either U1 (y) ￿ U1 (f (x)); or there exists a coalition
M+ of voters, such that jM+j = m + 1 and Ui (y) < Ui (x) for all i 2 M+:
37PROOF. We discuss three cases. Case 1. Take any y 2 X such that e(y) > e(x):
Since f (x) 2 S (e(x)); U1 (f (x)) = ￿ ￿ (m + 1)e(x) by Claim 2. Since f (y) 2
S (e(y)); similarly U1 (y) = (1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿ (￿ ￿ (m + 1)e(y)): Since e(y) > e(x);
U1 (f (x)) > U1 (y) given that ￿ 2 (0;1) is su¢ ciently large. Case 2. Take any y 2 X
such that e(y) < e(x): This implies that e(x) ￿ 1: Let M+ = Q(f (x);e(x)): Then
jM+j = m + 1 since f (x) 2 S (e(x)): By the reservation value functions constructed
in Step A, for all i 2 M+; Ui (y) = (1 ￿ ￿)yi+￿fi (y) and Ui (x) = (1 ￿ ￿)xi+￿e(x):
Since f (y) 2 S (e(y)); fj (y) 2 f0;e(y)g for all j 6= 1: Therefore, fi (y) < e(x) for
all i 2 M+: As a consequence, Ui (x) > Ui (y) for all i 2 M+; given that ￿ 2 (0;1)
is su¢ ciently large. Case 3. Take any y 2 X such that e(y) = e(x): By Claim 2,
U1 (f (x)) = ￿ ￿ (m + 1)e(y) and U1 (y) = (1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿ (￿ ￿ (m + 1)e(y)): Since
e(y) ￿
￿￿y1
m+1; y1 ￿ ￿ ￿ (m + 1)e(y): Then U1 (y) ￿ U1 (f (x)):
Proof of Theorem 2. This theorem breaks into three parts: (1) f1




k=1 S (k); and (3) f1
1 (x) ￿ ￿￿(m + 1)zm (x): They are proved by Steps
A, C, and D, respectively. Step B provides an instrumental result useful in Steps C
and D.
Step A. Suppose that f1
1 (x) < x1: Then by Lemma 1, for all ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently
large, U1 (f (x)) < x1 and U1 (f (x)) < U1 (x): This contradicts the optimality of f (x)
for the proposer. Therefore, f1
1 (x) ￿ x1:
Step B. For all K 2 Z+; let
R(K) ￿
n








￿ ￿ ￿ < m
o
:
Notice that fS (k);R(k)g
1
k=0 form a partition of the policy space X: Consider any
legislative equilibrium (f;fU‘g
n
‘=1): In this step we want to show that f (x) = x for
38all x 2
S1
k=o S (k) and f (x) 6= x for all x 2
S1
k=o R(k): In particular, we show that
the following two statements are true for all k 2 Z+:
S1. x 2 S (k) ) f (x) = x:
S2. x 2 R(k) ) f (x) 6= x:
The proof proceeds by math induction through a series of claims. Claim 1 shows
that S1 is true of k = 0: Claim 2 is an instrumental result useful in the rest of the
induction. Claim 3 shows that if S1 is true for some k = K 2 Z+ then S2 is also true
for k = K: Finally, Claim 4 shows that if both S1 and S2 are true for all k up to some
K 2 Z+ then S1 is true for k = K + 1:
CLAIM 1. S1 is true for k = 0:
PROOF. Notice that S (0) = fs1g and suppose that f (s1) 6= s1: Then f1 (s1) < ￿
and U1 (f (s1)) < ￿: As a consequence, U1 (s1) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿+￿U1 (f (s1)) > U1 (f (s1)):
This contradicts the optimality of f (s1) for the proposer.
CLAIM 2. Suppose x 2 R(K) for some K 2 Z+: Then x1 < ￿ ￿ (m + 1)K:
PROOF. Take any x 2 R(K): If K = 0 then obviously x1 < ￿ since x 6= s1:




￿ ￿ ￿ <
m; which is equivalent to the condition that j
S1
k=K Q(x;k)j ￿ m + 1: Let M+ =
S1
k=K Q(x;k) and discuss three cases below. Case 1. Suppose that there exists
j1 2 M+ such that xj1 ￿ K + 1: Then x1 ￿ ￿ ￿ mK ￿ (K + 1): Case 2. Suppose
that jM+j ￿ m + 2: Then x1 ￿ ￿ ￿ (m + 2)K: Case 3. Suppose that jM+j = m + 1
and xi = K for all i 2 M+: Then there must be some j2 = 2 (M+ [ f1g) such that
xj2 > 0: If this is not true, then x 2 S (K); which contradicts the supposition that
x 2 R(K): Again, x1 = ￿ ￿ (m + 1)K ￿ xj < ￿ ￿ (m + 1)K:
39CLAIM 3. Suppose that S1 is true for some k = K 2 Z+: Then S2 is true for
k = K:
PROOF. Take any x 2 R(K) and suppose that f (x) = x: Then U‘ (x) = x‘ for




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ m; so let M ￿
SK
k=o Q(x;k)
be such that jMj = m: Take any y 2 S (K) such that M ￿ Q(y;K): By S1 for
k = K; U‘ (y) = y‘ for all ‘ 2 N: Then Ui (y) = K ￿ Ui (x) for all i 2 M: Moreover,
U1 (y) = ￿ ￿ (m + 1)K > x1 = U1 (x); where the strict inequality is established by
Claim 2. We have shown that the proposer strictly prefers y to x and at least m
voters weakly prefer y to x: This contradicts the supposition that f (x) = x:
CLAIM 4. Suppose that S1 and S2 are true for all k up to some K 2 Z+: Then
S1 is true for k = K + 1:
PROOF. Take any x 2 S (K + 1) and suppose that f (x) 6= x: We discuss di⁄erent
possibilities for f1 (x) and look for a contradiction. First, suppose that f1 (x) 2
SK
k=1 R(k): Then f (f1 (x)) = f1 (x): This, however, contradicts the fact that S2 is
true for all k ￿ K: Second, suppose that f1 (x) 2 S (k) for some k ￿ K: Then for all
i 2 Q(x;K + 1); f1
i (x) 2 f0;kg so f1
i (x) ￿ k < K + 1 = xi: By Lemma 1, for ￿ 2
(0;1) su¢ ciently large, Ui (f (x)) < xi and Ui (f (x)) < Ui (x) for all i 2 Q(x;K + 1):
By de￿nition of S (K + 1); Q(x;K + 1) includes m+1 voters. Therefore, f (x) is not
politically feasible when the default is x: This is a contradiction. Third, suppose that
f1 (x) = b x 2 S (K + 1)nfxg: By de￿nition of f1; f (b x) = f1 (b x): Observe that all
elements of S (K + 1) are symmetric with respect to the voters. By the requirement
for symmetric stable sets in the de￿nition of a legislative equilibrium, f (x) = x as





and consider two cases. Case 1. If f1 (x) 2 S (k) for some k ￿ K + 2; then
obviously f1
1 (x) = ￿ ￿ (m + 1)(K + 2) < x1: Case 2. If f1 (x) 2 R(k) for some
40k ￿ K + 1; then by Claim 2, f1
1 (x) < ￿ ￿ (m + 1)(K + 1) = x1: In both cases,
f1
1 (x) < x1: By Lemma 1, for ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large, U1 (f (x)) < x1 and
U1 (f (x)) < U1 (x): This contradicts the optimality of f (x) for the proposer. Finally,
the only remaining possibility is that f1 (x) = x: This, however, contradicts the
supposition that f (x) 6= x:
Step C. Implied by Step B, f (x) = x if and only if x 2
S1
k=1 S (k): By de￿nition
of f1; f1 (x) 2
S1
k=1 S (k) for all x 2 X:
Step D. It remains to show that f1
1 (x) ￿ ￿ ￿ (m + 1)zm (x): Suppose to the
contrary that f1
1 (x) > ￿￿(m + 1)zm (x): By Step B, there exists K 2 Z+ such that
f1 (x) 2 S (K): Then Q(f1 (x);K) = m+1 and Q(f1 (x);0) = n￿m￿2: The as-
sumed lower bound of f1




Observe that, for all i 2 M0
+; f1
i (x) 2 f0;Kg so f1
i (x) ￿ K < zm (x) ￿ xi:
By Lemma 1, for ￿ 2 (0;1) su¢ ciently large, Ui (f (x)) < xi and Ui (f (x)) <
Ui (x) for all i 2 M0











￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ m + 1: This implies that f (x) is not politically feasible when
the default is x; which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Step A. Given the mixed strategy ￿ described the
proposition, we ￿rst construct the value functions according to the equation system





(1 ￿ ￿)x1 + ￿￿; if ‘ = 1;
(1 ￿ ￿)x‘; if ‘ 6= 1;









2￿; if ‘ = 1;
1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ x1); if ‘ 6= 1:
Step B. Given the value functions constructed in Step A, we then prove part 1 of
the proposition. Without loss of generality, take any x 2 X such that x2 ￿ x3 = 0:
Then U3 (s1) = U3 (x) = 0 and U1 (s1) = ￿ > U1 (z) for all z 6= s1: Therefore
￿ (x;s1) = 1:
Step C. Given the value functions constructed in Step A, we now prove part 2 of
the proposition. Without loss of generality, take any x 2 X such that x2 ￿ x3 > 0:
We want to show that (x1;￿ ￿ x1;0) and (x1;0;￿ ￿ x1) both solve problem (2) of
the proposer. Notice that U2 (x) = U3 (x) even if x2 6= x3: Therefore, it is without
loss of generality to consider only y = (x1;￿ ￿ x1;0): The proof proceeds with two
claims, where Claim 1 says that y is politically feasible, and Claim 2 says that no
other politically feasible policy yields the proposer a strictly higher expected utility
than y:
CLAIM 1. U1 (y) ￿ U1 (x) and Ui (y) ￿ Ui (x) for some i 6= 1:
PROOF. Applying the constructed value functions, we have U1 (y) ￿ U1 (x) =
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ x1) > 0 and U2 (y) ￿ U2 (x) = 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ ￿ x1) > 0:
CLAIM 2. For all z 2 X; either U1 (z) ￿ U1 (y) or Ui (z) < Ui (x) for all i 6= 1:
PROOF. Without loss of generality, take any z 2 X such that assume z2 ￿ z3:
We discuss the four cases below. Case 1. Suppose that z2 + z3 ￿ ￿ ￿ x1 ￿ 1 and





< 0: Case 2. Suppose that
z2 + z3 ￿ ￿ ￿ x1 ￿ 1 and z3 = 0: Then obviously U3 (z) = 0 < U3 (x): Moreover,
42U2 (z) ￿ U2 (x) = 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ x1) ￿ 2) < 0; where the strictly inequality is
true given that ￿ 2 (0;1) is su¢ ciently large. Case 3. Suppose that z2 + z3 ￿ ￿ ￿ x1
and z3 ￿ 1: Then z1 ￿ x1 and U1 (z) ￿ U1 (y) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(x1 ￿ z1 + ￿ (￿ ￿ z1)) ￿ 0:
Case 4. Suppose that z2+z3 ￿ ￿￿x1 and z3 = 0: Then z1 ￿ x1 and U1 (z)￿U1 (y) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(x1 ￿ z1) ￿ 0:
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that 1
2 ￿
x2￿x3
2￿(x2+x3) 2 [0;1] and Ui (x) < xi for
all i 6= 1; given that ￿ 2 (0;1) is su¢ ciently large.
Proof of Theorem 3. Without loss of generality, assume P = f1;2;:::;pg: Since
we do not care about the distribution of bene￿ts among committee members, we
transform the original game into an equivalent game with np ￿ 2m ￿ p + 2 players,
that consist of one single proposer and 2m ￿ p + 1 voters, and a quota voting rule
that requires mp ￿ m ￿ p + 1 votes from the voters to pass any new policy. The
equivalent policy space thus is ￿np
￿ ; where for any x 2 ￿n





i=1 xi and x0
j = xj+p￿1 for all j 2 f2;:::;npg: The policy rule and all
reservation value functions for the equivalent game can be de￿ned over the equivalent
policy space ￿np
￿ : A pure-strategy legislative equilibrium for the equivalent game can
then be de￿ned analogous to the de￿nition in Section 3. Finally, the proof of Theorem
2 also serves to characterize an equilibrium for the equivalent game if we substitute
n and m by np and mp; respectively, throughout the proof.
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